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Nijmegen 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands
From early in life, infants watch other people’s actions. How do young
infants come to make sense of actions they observe? Here, we review empiri-
cal findings on the development of action understanding in infancy. Based
on this review, we argue that active action experience is crucial for infants’
developing action understanding. When infants execute actions, they form
associations between motor acts and the sensory consequences of these
acts. When infants subsequently observe these actions in others, they can
use their motor system to predict the outcome of the ongoing actions.
Also, infants come to an understanding of others’ actions through the
repeated observation of actions and the effects associated with them. In
their daily lives, infants have plenty of opportunities to form associations
between observed events and learn about statistical regularities of others’
behaviours. We argue that based on these two forms of experience—active
action experience and observational experience—infants gradually develop
more complex action understanding capabilities.
1. Introduction
I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand.
Chinese proverb
From the first days of life, infants observe their environment and the people
acting in it. The human actions they watch form a continuous, intricate
stream of complex information. How do infants perceive these actions and
how do they eventually come to make sense of them? Which processes are
crucial for their understanding of others?
In this article, we describe the processes that are thought to support action
understanding in infancy. The paper starts with a discussion of methodological
and theoretical issues concerning the study of action understanding in infants.
Then, we review empirical findings on the early development of action under-
standing. Based on this review, we argue that active action experience is pivotal
for infants’ developing action understanding. Also, infants learn about others’
actions through repeated observation, using their statistical learning abilities. To
conclude, we propose that perceptual and motor experiences form the basis for
more complex action understanding abilities, such as intention understanding,
which develop later during childhood.
2. Studying action perception and action understanding in
infants
Studying action understanding in infancy is not an easy endeavour. Tradition-
ally, the great challenge of infancy research is to find measures that can tap into
infants’ cognitive processing. Different elegant research paradigms have been
developed and used throughout the last decades to unravel the development
of infants’ action perception and prediction.
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(a) Looking-time measures
For a long time, looking-time paradigms, such as the habitu-
ation or the violation of expectation paradigm, played a
predominant role in studies on infants’ action processing. In
the frequently implemented ‘Woodward-paradigm’, for
instance, infants are first repeatedly presented with an
action, which is directed at one of two target objects (often a
manual action, such as grasping) [1–3]. After habituation, it
is investigated whether infants’ attention recovers in response
to a change in target object compared to a change in motion
path. This suggests that infants selectively encoded the
relationship between an agent and the target of an observed
action [2] and is seen as an indication of goal attribution by
the infant. Also, looking-time paradigms have been used to
examine infants’ sensitivity to the efficiency of others’ actions
(e.g. [4–6]) as well as early mind-reading abilities (e.g. [7,8]).
Such studies implementing looking time as a measure of a
novelty response have been immensely important for the field,
as they provided the opportunity to systematically explore how
infants perceive and process others’ actions. These studies are,
for instance, informative about which aspects of an observed
action infants preferably attend to. On a more general note,
however, the suitability of habituation-based looking-time
methods to study complex cognitive mechanisms in infants
has been questioned, as fully controlling for perceptual differ-
ences between conditions and excluding low-level alternative
interpretations can be extremely difficult [9,10].
(b) Anticipatory looking measures
Recently, many studies started using anticipatory eye move-
ments during action observation as an indicator of infants’
action prediction [11–15]. It has been shown that when
watching actions, infants—like adults [16]—perform antici-
patory eye movements thereby predicting the course of the
observed action [17,18]. Measuring visual anticipations thus
allows assessing, for instance, which object infants expect
a person to grasp or act on [11,19], which path they expect
a locomoting agent to take [20,21] or whom of two interaction
partners they predict to act next [22].
Compared to habituation-based looking-time methods, the
measure of predictive gaze has several advantages [12]. It does
not require a habituation or learning phase and thus assesses
infants’ online predictions. In principle, it can also be employed
with older children or adults, which allows comparisons over
different populations. But most importantly, anticipatory
looks are a direct measure of the observer’s expectations,
whereas habituation-based looking-time measures can only
assess whether infants are sensitive to changes of a certain
aspect of a previously observed action. However, it is important
to note that this paradigm provides information about which
target location or target object infants expect an action to be
directed at, but does not allow any conclusions about whether
infants identified the higher order goal of the observed action
(cf. [12]): if an infant predicts that a person will bring a cup
she has grasped to her mouth rather than to another target
location, this does not necessarily imply that the infant has
identified the observed action as serving drinking.
(c) Other behavioural measures
Another elegant way of assessing infants’ perception and under-
standing of others’ actions is the use of infants’ overt behaviour
during interactive situations. Behne and colleagues, for instance,
studied infants’ responses to an experimenter who was either
unwilling or unable to pass infants a toy they wanted. This
allowed them to test whether infants show differential reactions
to behaviour expressing different intentions [23]. Other studies
used imitation tasks to examine infants’ perception of an
observed action. Infants as young as ninemonths readily imitate
actions they watch others perform [24], and the way a young
child reproduces an observed action can be informative about
how the child perceived and interpreted what she saw [25–27].
(d) Neuroscientific methods
Finally, the processes involved in action observation have been
directly studied at the brain level and different neuroscientific
techniques have been used to do so. Mostly, neural markers
that have been well established in adult research are
implemented to investigate how infants process actions they
observe [28–30]. Based on the idea that during action obser-
vation, an internal motor representation of that same
behaviourwithin the observer is activated [31,32],many studies
have focused on measuring activation of the infant’s motor
system during action observation. In human electroencephalo-
graphy (EEG), spectral power in the m and b frequency band
over the motor cortex decreases with movement, intent to
move or during the observation of others’ actions [33,34]. There-
fore,m andbwave suppression are frequently used as indices of
motor activation during action observation also in infants (see
for reviews, [35,36]). As EEG has a poor spatial resolution,
recent studies have also made use of functional near-infrared
spectroscopy (fNIRS) to study which brain areas are activated
when infants process others’ actions [37–40]. Carefully
designed neuroimaging studies bear a great potential of further
unravelling the mechanisms of action processing in infancy.
A general challenge of infancy research and thus also the
study of action perception and understanding in infants is
that we can never be entirely sure how an infant perceived
the experimental situation and must rely on our inter-
pretation of the infant’s responses. Although the issue of a
possible over-interpretation of findings on infants’ cognitive
processes has mainly been discussed in the context of
looking-time paradigms (e.g. [9,41–43]), it applies to all
methods that employ indirect evidence to get at infants’ cog-
nitive abilities. It is thus important to keep an open mind for
lower level mechanisms that may account for findings that at
first glance seem to imply high-level cognitive operations,
such as intention attribution, in infants. Moreover, seeking
converging evidence across different methods and from
different laboratories might also be of crucial importance.
Putting together evidence from different theoretical
approaches and research paradigms, we see that our under-
standing of infants’ action perception and understanding
has increased tremendously over the last decennia. We now
turn to reviewing empirical findings on how infants’ action
understanding develops and which mechanisms are crucial
for the emergence of action understanding in infancy.
3. The role of active action experience for action
understanding
A number of theoretical approaches emphasize the importance
of one’s own action experience for action comprehension
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[44,45] and stress the close link between action experience and
action understanding early in infancy [46].
(a) Action experience and action understanding in
adults
When adults observe other people performing actions, they
readily process and interpret what they see in terms of hier-
archically organized action goals (e.g. [47]). According to
ideomotor theories [31,48,49], observing someone else per-
form an action activates an internal motor representation of
that same behaviour within the observer. This activation
of the observer’s own action system is thought to support
action decoding and understanding (e.g. [50–52]). Initial
accounts assumed a ‘direct matching’ between observed
actions and the activation in the motor cortex and proposed
that action understanding occurs as a result of an automatic
mapping [52,53].
However, action understanding occurring solely from
the immediate sensory input of the observed action is poss-
ible only in rare cases of simple, unambiguous actions. If we
were to observe a person reaching for a scalpel, how would
we be able to tell whether the person is going to perform a
lifesaving operation on a patient or whether he is going to
kill the person lying helplessly in front of him? This
discrimination cannot be made solely based on the obser-
vation of the grasping action itself, but only when taking
into account contextual information, for instance whether
the action we observe is situated in an operation room or
not (Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde example from [54]). Some
recent theories thus propose that action prediction and
action understanding occur from a combination of motor
simulation and information coming from the context
of the observed action and our knowledge about the
world [55–57].
The discovery of so-called mirror neurons in the ventral
premotor cortex of the macaque monkey in the early 1990s
provided neurophysiological support for theories that
emphasize the role of motor simulations in action under-
standing and imitation. This set of premotor neurons has
been shown to respond when monkeys perform an action
as well as when they sit motionless observing someone else
performing this action [58]. A similar action observation–
execution matching system has been proposed to exist in
the human brain and is thought to involve the ventral pre-
motor cortex and the inferior frontal gyrus [52,59], as well
as the primary motor cortex [60].
In adults, the extent of mirror activation during action
observation is dependent on the observer’s experience of
physically performing this action [61–63]. If an action that
is outside of the human repertoire is observed (such as bark-
ing), there is typically little activation found in the premotor
areas [64]. Expert dancers who watch another person dan-
cing show stronger motor activation than control subjects
who are trained in another dance style. For acquired
motor skills, motor activation thus is modulated by the
observer’s level of proficiency and motor familiarity with
that skill [65], whereas solely visual familiarity with the
action acquired through observation seems to have far less
impact [66].
Probably owing to enhanced simulation of the observed
kinematic acts ([67–70]; cf. [71]), observers are better at pre-
dicting the outcome of actions [72] and at estimating the
duration [73] of motorically familiar actions when they
watch them performed by others. Moreover, experienced
adults tend to outperform novices when asked to recognize,
categorize and recall observed actions [74–77]. Also, motor
experience can have a direct impact on visual action recog-
nition without being mediated by visual experience. If
adult participants are trained on a novel coordinated body
movement while being blindfolded, they improve in their
visual recognition of this movement without having received
any visual feedback about this new action [74]. The adult lit-
erature thus provides us with broad evidence that motor
expertise fundamentally changes how humans perceive and
process actions they observe in others, which leads to the
question of whether motor experience is as powerful at chan-
ging action perception and augmenting action understanding
early in life.
(b) Action experience and action understanding in
infants
Already Jean Piaget [78] put forth the idea that action experi-
ence is fundamental to cognitive development. Beyond
a general effect of action on cognition [79–81], infants’
experience in carrying out specific actions contributes to
their understanding of these same actions in others. Several
theoretical accounts stress that action production and under-
standing are deeply intertwined from early infancy and that
this relation drives the early development of social under-
standing (e.g. [82,83]). It has even been suggested that we
can only perceive and understand in others what we can
do ourselves [45].
In line with these theoretical accounts, we propose that
action experience is an important process through which
infants develop the capacity of action understanding.
Their active experiences provide infants with rich, multi-
faceted representations of actions and the corresponding
action effects (cf. [84,85]). Through repeated execution of
actions, infants form associations between these motor
acts and their sensory consequences [86]. When infants
subsequently observe these actions in others, they can
use their motor system to predict the outcome of the
ongoing actions.
A broad body of studies on the relationship between
infants’ action experience and action perception are in
support of this view. First of all, studies employing a broad
range of methods (such as EEG, fNIRS or electromyographic
recordings) have shown that when infants observe others’
actions, their neural motor system becomes activated
[87–90,28,39]. However, how exactly the mirror system devel-
ops in infancy and early childhood is still a matter of debate
[91]. Whereas some researchers suggest that humans are
equippedwith an innate matching system, at least in a rudimen-
tary form [92,93], others propose that themirror properties of the
human brain develop as a result of sensorimotor learning
[57,94,95]. Both notions, however, acknowledge that the mirror
system is modulated by sensorimotor learning throughout the
course of development.
In line with this and in analogy to adult findings on the
effects of motor expertise, motor activation during action
observation has been found to be influenced by the infant’s
motor skills [96]. Infants who were proficient crawlers
showed a stronger activation of their motor system when
watching other infants crawling compared with walking,
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
369:20130490
3
 on May 14, 2016http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
and this effect appeared to be directly related to the duration
of their crawling experience, even when controlling for
maturational age. Moreover, in another recent study, we
showed that eight-month-old infants who had been trained
to shake a novel rattle to produce a specific sound effect for
a week responded with motor activation to the rattle sound
during a subsequent test session. This suggests that young
infants readily acquire new sensorimotor associations and
speaks to the flexibility of the developing mirror system [86].
Butwhat is the evidence that active action experience indeed
enhances infants’ action processing and understanding? Several
studies now suggest that in adults, motor activation during
action observation is causally related to generating predictions
about the course of the observed actions [68–70]. These studies
have used a motor interference task [68] or transcranial mag-
netic stimulation of the motor cortex [69,70] to show that
motor system activity is necessary to perform anticipatory eye
movements to the target of an ongoing observed action. In
addition, there is strong evidence that infants’ motor experience
is closely linked to their action prediction [97–99]. It has been
demonstrated that infants’ ability to anticipate the target
object of an observed grasping action is synchronized with the
onset of their performance of these actions [97,98]. In accord-
ance with these findings, we showed in a recent study that
infants whowere proficient crawlers but inexperiencedwalkers
were more accurate in visually predicting the timing of other
infants’ crawling compared with walking. Toddlers and
adults who were experienced in both, walking and crawling,
performed equally well for both observed actions [99].
More generally, many studies have shown that infants
process actions differently if they have active experience
with them [100–104]. When infants of 10 months of age,
for instance, observe a means-end action within the ‘Wood-
ward-paradigm’, they respond selectively to a change in
target object only if they are capable of carrying out means-
end actions themselves [105]. In another study, infants as
young as three months of age were given the opportunity
to gain action experience with successful goal achievement:
infants were equipped with sticky mittens, which enabled
them to ‘grasp’ a toy, which they otherwise would not have
been able to do. Afterwards, they watched another person
grasping similar toys. The infants who had been provided
with additional action experience were more sensitive to a
switch in the target objects of the grasping actions than
infants who had not experienced ‘grasping’ themselves [106].
Training studies, in which infants receive active experi-
ence performing novel actions, are especially important in
this context, as they allow examining causal effects of action
experience. Using this approach, it has been shown that
receiving experience with novel actions changes how infants
process these actions when they perceive them performed by
others and that such effects are evident in their looking be-
haviour [100,101,104,106] as well as in the response of their
neural motor system [86]. More of such training studies are
needed to better understand how infants’ action perception
and understanding are facilitated by active experience.
In summary, a broad body of literature now demonstrates
that action experience changes how infants perceive others’
actions. Specifically, it has been shown that the motor system
of the brain processes actions differently depending on whether
they are in the infant’s motor repertoire or not. Recent adult
research has provided evidence that the motor system is cau-
sally involved in making predictions about observed actions,
and, in line with this, infants have been shown to be better at
predicting the course of an ongoing action, which is motori-
cally familiar to them. In summary, there is now strong
support for the notion that infants’ action experience plays a
fundamental role in their developing action understanding.
4. The role of observational experience for action
understanding
Of course, active action experience is not the only road to and
sole prerequisite for action understanding. As adults, we are
able to understand that a bird is flying from the ground
onto a tree, although we have no experience with this specific
action ourselves. However, we have observed many birds fly
in our lives and have learned from these observations. Like-
wise, infants are also able to pick up information about
actions long before they can carry these actions out themselves,
as they show vivid interest in others’ actions from early in life.
By six months of age, for instance, infants have acquired some
knowledge about everyday objects and how these are typically
handled [12,14,29,107]. Without having actively experienced
the observed actions and thus solely based on their observa-
tional experience, six-month-old infants show predictive
looks to the mouth when they see a person grasp a cup and
to the ear when they see her pick up a phone [12].
How does observational experience enhance infants’ action
processing and understanding? How do infants come to pre-
dict how an action will unfold without having ever
performed it themselves? One route of observational learning
may be through associative and statistical learning. From birth
onwards, human infants are able to quickly form associations
between events (e.g. [108]). Moreover, young infants have been
shown to aggregate information over multiple occurrences and
extract statistical patterns from repeated observations [109].
Infants’ impressive statistical learning abilities have been
demonstrated to be present from a very young age on and
across different domains [109]. By eight months of age, by
example, infants can use the statistical structure in a continu-
ous stream of syllables to extract which syllables co-occur
and thus tend to form words [110]. They also detect statistical
regularities in sequences of tones and visual stimuli
[109,111,112]. By about 1 year of age, infants quickly associate
new words and objects [113], even if they have to aggregate
information over multiple and individually ambiguous
scenes [114]. On the basis of this evidence, statistical learning
has been suggested to play a crucial role in early cognitive
and social-cognitive development [109,115].
In the action domain, infants have plenty of opportunities
to form associations between observed events and learn
about statistical regularities of others’ behaviours. From
early on, their attention is drawn to human motion [116]
and to other people’s faces and hands [117]. This provides
infants with crucial information about others’ actions, but
also their gaze, emotional expressions and information
about objects and how they are manipulated. Moreover,
infants learn about the statistical regularities within the see-
mingly endless, complicated stream of actions they observe
in others, and towards the end of the first year of life infants
can parse a series of actions they observe into segments of
meaningful sub-actions [118]. They begin to attend especially
to the effects of actions they observe [119] and expect a person
to reach for the same target object again after they have
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observed her grasping it before [11,120]. When observing an
agent repeatedly move along one of two paths, infants as
young as nine months of age quickly learn to anticipate
which path it will take, and the frequency information stem-
ming from previous observations seems to be the strongest
factor guiding infants’ action predictions [21].
Forming associations between events (such as between an
everyday object like a cup and the location where it is normally
brought, the mouth) and extracting regularities from a series of
observations thus probably helps infants to predict how actions
will unfold which they cannot yet simulate in their motor
system. In a recent study, we showed that when learning
about others’ actions through observation, infants might not
only form associations between visual events, but also between
different modalities, as they were able to link the percept of a
novel action effect to their motor system through mere action
observation [121]. Infants of nine months of age observed
their parents shaking a novel rattle and bringing about a dis-
tinct sound effect during several training sessions within one
week. When subsequently listening to the rattle’s sound
effect, they showed an increased motor activation. Without
ever having shaken the novel rattle themselves, just through
observing their parents’ actions, infants had formed an associ-
ation between the sound effect and the action representation in
their own motor system. This illustrates that perceptual action
experience can include more than just the visual domain.
When infants were observing their parents handling the
rattle, the representation of the corresponding action in their
own motor system was probably activated and associated
with the novel sound effect (cf. [122] for an equivalent finding
with adults). This acquisition of novel action-effect associations
might form the basis for infants’ unique social learning abilities.
Observing others’ actions thus is an important route to
action understanding in infancy. Only a few studies, however,
have aimed to answer the intriguing question which of the
two types of experience, active or observational, has more
impact on infants’ action processing. From these studies, it
appears that active action experience is especially powerful
and has a unique effect on infants’ action processing early in
development [101,123], at least in the case of short-term,
within-experiment effects. However, whereas a brief period of
active action experience seems to be sufficient to change infants’
processing of the exact same action [106,123], for action proces-
sing to fundamentally change and generalization over different
situations to take place, more active action experience seems to
be necessary [15,96,101,123]. Yet, it remains difficult to directly
compare the impact of both processes because experimentally
matching active and observational experience is challenging.
In the daily life of an infant, of course, active and observational
action experience occurs intermixed and closely connected.
Whereas younger infants with limited motor abilities might
rely more on their observation of others’ actions, with motor
development progressing, active experience probably gains
importance (cf. [12]). In the end, action understanding might
emerge from a complex interaction of both processes, and
examining how exactly these processes interact to bring about
action understanding is an exciting research direction (cf. [124]).
5. The principle of rational action
Aside from self-produced actions and observational action
experience, there are other mechanisms infants have been
suggested to rely on to understand actions they observe.
For instance, infants might apply a rational principle to
actions they observe and have expectations about the efficient
means an agent will choose to achieve a goal (e.g. [26,125]).
Infants are thought to also use this rational principle to
understand actions they observe. By assessing what end
state would be efficiently brought about by an action and at
the same time taking into account the particular situational
constraints, infants might be able to infer the likely goal of
the observed action [126,127].
When presented with a non-human agent (i.e. a ball)
approaching a goal by a detour path, such as jumping over
an obstacle, infants of six to nine months of age have indeed
been shown to look longer when the agent still used the
detour rather than a direct path after the obstacle was removed
[4–6]. However, new empirical studies have demonstrated
possible alternative explanations to paradigms that were
thought to measure infants’ rational analysis of an observed
action [21,128–131]. It has, for instance, been suggested that
infants’ longer looking to an agent taking a detour rather
than a direct path might not be caused by their surprise
about the inefficient action, but might be a response to an
event, which is inconsistent with their long-term experience
with objects and agents in the environment. In daily life, infants
hardly ever observe that humans and other agents perform
sudden jumps during their movements, and balls tend to
move linearly across surfaces without making swerves. In
accordance with this alternative explanation, a recent study
from our own laboratory found evidence that in a paradigm
in which an agent could choose between an efficient and an
inefficient path, it was only frequency information about pre-
vious actions that determined infants’ action predictions [21].
More evidence for infants’ use of a rational principle
when processing others’ actions originally came from the
rational imitation paradigm. In the rational imitation para-
digm, it is examined whether infants take into account
observed situational constraints when imitating [26]. After
having observed a model whose hands are constrained act
on a light switch with her head, infants tend to imitate the
action using their hands and thus appear to take into account
the situational constraints of the model, which do not apply
to themselves. The authors thus suggested that imitative be-
haviour reflects cognitive processes, such as an evaluation
of the observed action in terms of efficiency. Several recent
studies have challenged these findings by demonstrating
that imitation behaviour, which appeared to be guided by
the child’s reasoning about the observed situation, might
have been caused by lower level perceptual and motor pro-
cesses [128–131]. As the discussion is still ongoing
[132,133], it is currently unclear whether infants already
make use of a rational principle to understand others’ actions.
But how might infants develop an expectation that other
agents choose efficient means? One possibility is that infants
need active experience before their perception of others’ actions
is influenced by the efficiency principle [134,135]. From adult
research, we know that our perception of a situation is strongly
dependent on our action capabilities. The same distance, for
example, looks farther to an elderly than to a young person,
and a hill is judged to be steeper by individuals who are
out-of-shape compared with fit subjects [136,137]. In the
same vein, infants might need active experience with locomot-
ing and the effort it takes to move along short and long paths
in order to learn about efficiency and develop expectations
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about other agents’ efficient means. Additionally, infants
might learn through repeated observation that agents in their
environment tend to prefer the shortest routes, direct
grasps or least effortful means across different situations
(cf. [21]). More research is needed to clarify how perceptual
and motor experience influence the development of
efficiency expectations.
6. From behaviour reading to mind reading
So far, we have discussed how infants become able to
predict and understand actions they observe. Mature action
understanding, however, exceeds this kind of action under-
standing, because as adults we not only have the ability to
predict how an observed action might unfold, but also to
attribute an intention to the action. As illustrated in the
example of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde mentioned before [54],
the extraction of an intention from an action is not trivial,
as different intentions—here, to cure or harm—can underlie
the same specific action. But how do infants progress from
reading others’ behaviours to understanding others’ minds?
It has been suggested that infants possess the ability to
understand others’ intentions from early on and that their
action understanding might thus already go beyond what is
directly observable in an action. For example, infants’ perform-
ance in theWoodward-paradigm has been interpreted by some
as an indication that six-month-olds did not only learn about
the relationship between an actor and the target object of her
grasping actions, but are also able to understand that it is her
intention to grasp this object. Moreover, in an interaction
study, nine-month-old infants have been reported to respond
differently to an experimenter who was either unwilling to
give them a toy or tried but failed [23]. Also, it has been
shown that when observing an adult model trying but failing
to perform an action on a novel tool (such as trying to pull
apart two parts of a dumbbell), infants of 18 months imitate
the action as it might have been intended, although they
never actually observed the model carry it out successfully [27].
However, several recent papers have rightly reminded us
that we must be careful to not over-interpret infants’ behav-
iour, which at first sight might appear to be evidence for
infants’ intention understanding. They provided alternative,
lower level interpretations of these and other findings, which
used to bolster claims of advanced action understanding abil-
ities in infants (e.g. [115,138–140]). In this context, it has, for
example, been argued that infants’ imitation of unobserved
end states does not necessarily imply that they understood
the intentions of the model who tried but failed to perform a
certain action. Their imitation performance might simply be
the result of them copying the model’s trying behaviour,
which inevitably led to the ‘intended’ result [115]. Also the
fact that infants respond differentially to an experimenter
who is either unwilling to give them a toy or tried but failed
to pass it to them does not prove that infants correctly ident-
ified these different intentions. However, it might just be a
consequence of the fact that the adult’s behaviours are indica-
tive of different probabilities of them eventually getting the
toy [115]. It thus remains an open question whether infants
understand others’ intentions from early in life onwards.
Alternatively, young children might gradually develop
from being able to read others’ behaviours to understanding
others’ minds on the basis of their experiences with own and
others’ actions. As the Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde example
shows, intention understanding exceeds a one-to-one mapping
between an observed action and an intention. In many cases,
therefore, an integration of contextual information is necessary,
such as information about the situation in which the actions
take place or the emotional expression on the actors’ faces
[55–57]. Throughout the months and years of early childhood,
infants have ample opportunity to collect probabilistic knowl-
edge about others and their actions as well as the different
situations in which they occur. Their steadily growing knowl-
edge influences their perception of others’ actions and might
further shape their action understanding (cf. [141]). In line
with this, it has been proposed that young children gradually
come to understand unobservable action goals through the
experience of their own actions and mental states as well as
their impressive statistical learning skills that allow them to
see patterns in observed and experienced behaviours [115].
A failure to acquire such contextual knowledge necessary to
modulate the direct perception of actions and understand
non-observable action goals might even be at the core of
developmental disorders like autism (cf. [142,143]).
7. Conclusion
In this article, we have outlined how infants come to under-
stand actions they observe in others on the basis of their
perceptual and motor experiences. When infants are still
young, they might primarily learn about others’ actions
through observation. Using their powerful associative and
statistical learning abilities, infants can pick up on regularities
in others’ actions and on which actions are followed by which
action effects. As their motor development progresses,
infants’ active action experience becomes an essential source
of their developing action understanding. On the basis of
these general mechanisms, young children might gradually
develop also more complex action understanding abilities,
which allow them to progress from being able to read
others’ behaviours to understanding others’ minds.
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